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Introduction
The OECD labour market has undergone major changes over the past two decades.  The most evident
of these changes is the rise in the number of job-seekers: in 1997, there were more than 35 million
people unemployed in the OECD area as a whole, some 6 million more than in the mid-1980s and
almost 25 million more than in the early 1970s. These figures hide profound differences across
countries.  In the major European countries, unemployment has increased dramatically over the past
two decades and, in some of them, including Italy, Spain and France, increases that were initially
cyclical have tended to become structural over time.  More recently, other countries, including Finland
and Sweden have experienced drastic increases in the number of job seekers in the 1990s after a long
period of low unemployment.  The rather gloomy picture of many continental European economies
contrasts with the experience of some non-European countries which have managed to keep
unemployment at low levels (e.g. Japan) or have experienced significant reductions over the 1990s (the
United States, New Zealand and, more recently, Australia).  Even in Europe there are a few countries
that have managed to contain the number of  job-seekers (e.g. Norway) or have shown clear
improvements in the recent past (Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark).
Another key feature of the European labour market is the rise in long-term unemployment and
discouragement among the  job-seekers.  In the EU countries as a whole, about one-third of the
unemployed spend more than one year without a job.  Likewise, many people of working age would like
to work, but are not actively searching for a job because they have become discouraged from doing so.
Indeed, the non-employment rate – the ratio of inactive and unemployed people over the entire
working-age population – suggests that more than 40 per cent of those in the working-age did not work
in the major continental European economies, against a quarter in Japan and less than one-third in the
United States.  Falls in participation rates are generally recorded at the two extremes of the working age
distribution: among younger and older workers.  In the first case, they are associated with increased
school enrolment rates, even if the latter are partly also the by-product of poor employment prospect for
teenagers and young people.  For older individuals facing redundancy and insecure employment
prospects, going into early retirement became an attractive alternative to maintaining a foothold in the
labour market, especially in countries offering generous pension benefits.
To what extent are these marked differences in labour market performances related to different
labour market policies and, more generally, labour market institutions?  An impressive number of
studies has been devoted to this question, but the issue is still far from being settled.  The OECD
countries indeed show a wide range of labour market policy strategies as well as very different
institutional settings that intervene in the functioning of the market.  Moreover, some studies (including
OECD, 1994 and 1997b) suggest that the success of some economies in combating unemployment has,
at least partially, been the result of far-reaching reforms, while persistently high unemployment is a
signal insufficient reforms in the labour market.  The Jobs Strategy of the OECD has, in particular,
outlined the importance of simultaneous and co-ordinated actions in different areas affecting the labour
market (Box 1).  This is because there are synergies between different actions and because actions that
affect the majority of the population are generally considered fairer than those focusing on specific
areas and, often, specific social groups.4
Box 1. The OECD Jobs Strategy
The 1994 OECD Jobs Study proposed a wide-ranging programme of action to combat labour-market
imbalances and promote the standards of living in the OECD countries. The Jobs Strategy ensuing from
this programme covers macro-economic policies, policies to improve the ability of economies to adjust and
adapt to rapidly changing circumstances, and those geared to enhance the long-term growth of living
standards and employment opportunities, not least by increasing and upgrading human capital, fostering
entrepreneurship and strengthening innovative capacity.  In particular, ten recommendations were put
forward (see also OECD, 1997b):
1. Set macroeconomic policy such that it will both encourage growth and, in conjunction with good structural
policies, make it sustainable, i.e. non-inflationary.
2. Enhance the creation and diffusion of technological know-how by improving frameworks for its
development.
3. Increase flexibility of working-time (both short-term and lifetime) voluntarily sought by workers and
employers.
4. Nurture an entrepreneurial climate by eliminating impediments to, and restrictions on, the creation and
expansion of enterprises.
5. Make wage and labour costs more flexible by removing restrictions that prevent wages from reflecting
local conditions and individual skill levels, in particular of younger workers.
6. Reform employment security provisions that inhibit the expansion of employment in the private sector.
7. Strengthen the emphasis on active labour market policies and reinforce their effectiveness.
8. Improve labour force skills and competencies through wide-ranging changes in education and training
systems.
9. Reform unemployment and related benefit systems -- and their interactions with the tax system -- such that
societies’ fundamental equity goals are achieved in ways that impinge far less on the efficient functioning
of the labour markets.
10. Enhance product market competition so as to reduce monopolistic tendencies and weaken insider-outsider
mechanisms while also contributing to a more innovative and dynamic economy.
The OECD work on the Jobs Strategy has also revealed the importance of looking at labour market
reforms from a cross-country perspective, where countries can learn from each-other and best practice
could be identified.  This experience may also be useful for Latin American countries.  Since the early
eighties, the OECD economies have been confronted with much of the same challenges facing Latin
American countries today.  These include changes in monetary regime and the convergence towards
price stability; trade expansion and, for the European countries, trade integration with the advent of the
single market; globalisation and rapid technological changes.   At the same time, some of the key
features of the labour market in Latin America – rising unemployment, lower employment growth, high
incidence of joblessness among women and the youth etc. (see Marquez, 1998) – have characterised the
OECD labour markets for almost two decades and, thus, their experience may help the policy debate in
Latin America.
The purpose in this paper is two-fold: i) to describe the key labour market policy and institutional
settings in the different OECD countries with a particular attention to recent reforms, and ii) to present
empirical evidence on the effects of these policies and institutions on labour market performances.  The
following elements will be considered:  i) unemployment benefit systems; ii) active labour market5
policies; iii) employment protection legislation; iv) collective wage bargaining systems and statutory
minimum wages; and, finally, v) taxes on use of labour.  Moreover, the paper discusses some of the
crucial aspects of the reform strategy, i.e. wide-ranging versus piece-meal reforms; the role of social
partners in the design and implementation of reforms; and, the timing of reforms.
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 discusses recent developments in the labour market,
while Section 3 provides an overview of recent structural reforms in the OECD countries.  Section 4
focuses on some of the key features of the reform strategy pursued by the different countries, while
Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Recent labour market developments in the OECD countries
2.1 Actual and structural unemployment
Labour-market performances have worsened in the OECD area in the course of the 1990s, with a rise
in the area-wide unemployment rate from 6 per cent in 1990 to 7.3 per cent in 1997 (Figure 1).  There
are, however, major differences across countries.  The United States has experienced a substantial
reduction in the number of job seekers and Japan a continuation of relatively low joblessness rates
despite the protracted period of weak economic activity.  On the contrary, unemployment has increased
from already high rates in most European-Union (EU) economies.  Among individual countries,
unemployment has risen further in Spain, Italy and France.  Moreover, the number of job seekers has
stood up in countries like Finland and Sweden that had previously been considered relatively immune to
major labour market imbalances.  Notwithstanding this overall trend, there have also been encouraging
signals emerging in countries like the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands where
unemployment has significantly declined over the 1990s.  Moreover, significant improvements have
recently surfaced in Denmark and to a lesser extent in Canada.
An international comparison of labour market conditions should consider that each individual country
may be in a different position of the business cycle, and thus that actual unemployment at any point in
time may significantly diverge from structural (or equilibrium) unemployment.  As an illustration,
Panel A of Figure 2 plots estimates of structural unemployment for a number of OECD countries in
1997.  These estimates are based on the so called  non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment
(NAWRU), that is to say, the unemployment rate which is consistent with a stable growth rate of
wages
2.  Bearing in mind that these estimates of NAWRU are somewhat fragile reeds, Panel A suggests
that the marked differences in actual unemployment rates are largely reflected in differences in their
structural unemployment rates.
                                                  
2.  The estimates of the NAWRU are based on observed movements in wages and unemployment.  Under the assumption
that changes in wage inflation are proportional to the difference between actual unemployment and the NAWRU, the
following relationship holds:  ( ) D
2 0 log , W u NAWRU = - - > a a where D is the first-difference
operator and W and u are the wage level and the unemployment rate.  Using consecutive observations and assuming
that the NAWRU is constant over two contiguous observations, an estimate of a could be obtained as follows:
a = - D D
3 logW u From that it is possible to derive an estimate of the
( ) NAWRU u u W W = - D D D
3 2 log log .  It should be stressed that the NAWRU is, by construction, an
indicator of the short-term equilibrium rate of unemployment insofar as it measures the rate of unemployment that,
given the recent history of unemployment, could be associated with a stable growth rate of wages.  In the presence of
significant speed-limit effects and/or hysteresis, a higher (or lower) long-run equilibrium rate of unemployment could
be associated with a stable wage inflation, but this rate could not be reached over one year without setting off wage
inflation.  See also Elmeskov and McFarlan (1993).67
Figure 2.  Structural and cyclical components of unemployment rates
1
Per cent of total labour force
1. Based on national unemployment definitions. Structural unemployment data are based on Secretariat estimates of the
    non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU) made for the OECD Economic Outlook, 60, 1996.
Source: OECD.
Change 1990-97
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Panel B of Figure 2 plots changes in the NAWRU over the 1990s.  Countries are ordered from left to
right according to the absolute change in the NAWRU, that is, from the largest reductions to the largest
increases.  Most continental European countries are on the right-hand side of the panel, among the
countries with the highest increases in structural unemployment.  This suggests that at least part of the
increase in actual unemployment in Europe is not likely to be reabsorbed in the current recovery period
but will arguably require structural reforms.
The most encouraging recent development in the OECD area has been the success of countries like the
United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands and New Zealand in curbing their structural unemployment
rates. Ireland experienced the largest reduction, although from a very high figure. In continental
Europe, the Netherlands offers another promising example of a successful combat against
unemployment: from being one of the countries with the highest rate of joblessness in the early 1980s, it
managed to bring it down to substantially below the OECD average. On the opposite side of the world,
a comprehensive reform strategy in New Zealand has offset part of the increase in unemployment that
took place until the early 1990s.
2.2 Who are the unemployed in the OECD countries
There are a number of common features in the OECD countries concerning the incidence of
unemployment across different population groups (Figure 3):
-  Youth unemployment rates are generally positively associated with aggregate
unemployment rates: the higher the aggregate unemployment rate, the higher the youth
unemployment rate.  The level of youth unemployment is, however, generally higher than
the aggregate unemployment rates, with the exception of Germany -- where the access to
work of young workers is facilitated by the existence of widespread apprenticeship
schemes – as well as in Australia and Denmark.
-  Unskilled workers generally face a much higher incidence of unemployment than other
groups in most OECD countries.  There is also a tendency for the greatest gap between
unskilled unemployment and aggregate unemployment to be found in countries with
relatively lower aggregate joblessness.
-  Women are disproportionally affected by joblessness in several countries including Greece,
Spain, Belgium and Italy.
-  Joblessness has also a clear  regional dimension, notably in some Southern European
countries (Spain and Italy) where the very low unemployment rate of certain regions
coexists with extremely high rates in others.
-  The incidence of long-term unemployment (those without a job for 12 months or more) in
total unemployment is particularly large in Europe outside the Nordic countries, and
particularly so in the countries estimated to have the highest structural unemployment rates.
These basic features of unemployment incidence have remained broadly unchanged during the 1990s,
with changes in the overall structural unemployment rate generally being followed by changes in the
same direction of the structural unemployment rates for disadvantaged groups.  For example, the
countries with falling overall structural unemployment have (with only a few exceptions) experienced a
reduction in long-term, youth, and female unemployment rates, and even the unemployment rate for the
unskilled has declined in two of them.  However, the reduction in group-specific rates has often failed to9
decline as much as the overall structural unemployment rate, as improved labour-market conditions
have, in the first instance, been concentrated on the most employable of the structurally unemployed.
The evolution of group-specific unemployment rates has been more disparate in countries with constant
or increasing overall structural unemployment, partly reflecting the differences in targeting of
labour-market interventions on vulnerable groups
3.
2.3 Under-employment and broad unemployment rates
The unemployment rate is by far the most used, and perhaps the most reliable, indicator of labour
market performance.  However, it does not capture all forms of labour market slack.  In the OECD
countries, certain workers would like to work more hours (or full-time) but could not find such jobs.
Others are available to take up work but not actively looking for it - and hence are not classified as
unemployed
4.  The inclusion of these two elements in the count of labour market slack does not,
however, offer a markedly different picture of cross-country disparities in labour market performances
5.
In many, especially European, countries there has also been a distinct increase in the number of
job-seekers enrolled in active labour market programmes and often excluded from the count of
unemployment.  This creates a problem in the count of the “real” unemployment problem: increasing
expenditures for - and participation in – active programmes will tend to reduce observed unemployment
without any effective change in the joblessness problem.  Moreover, the downward bias is likely to
increase in recessionary periods when unemployment increases because more job seekers will involved
in active programmes.  There are significant cross-country differences: unemployed participant inflows
into these programmes range from less than one per cent of the labour force in Japan and Luxembourg,
to more than 10 per cent in France, Denmark, Finland and Sweden
6.
2.4 Employment dynamics
Employment performance has been a key determinant of changes in structural unemployment.  With the
notable exception of the United Kingdom, where the growth in private sector employment has not fully
compensated the decline in public-sector employment, all countries with falling structural
unemployment have experienced solid employment gains.  These gains were in most of the cases due to
the growth of private-sector employment. At the other end of the spectrum, the rise in structural
unemployment in most of continental Europe can largely be explained by the severe contraction of
private-sector employment (Figure 4).
                                                  
3.  For example, unemployment spells are broken in several of the countries registering constant or rising structural
unemployment rates (e.g. Belgium, Sweden and Finland), as the unemployed are offered jobs or training to prevent
long-term unemployment.  Also, labour-market policy directed at youth and the  low-skilled could reduce the
incidence of unemployment among these groups without affecting the overall structural unemployment due to
substitution effects.
4.  As a proportion of the labour force, available measures of involuntary part-time and discouragement indicate that the
magnitude of overall labour market slack may be 2 to 9 percentage points above that measured by the traditional
unemployment rate.  In the OECD area as a whole the proportion between involuntary part-time workers and
discouraged workers is one to four.  Only in Japan, there are many more discouraged workers than involuntary
part-time workers.  See OECD, Employment Outlook (1995).
5.  The correlation between the unemployment rate and the broader measure including involuntary part-time and
discouraged workers was 0.84 in 1993. See also OECD, Employment Outlook, 1995.
6.  Available information on unemployment flows also point to large cross-country disparities: in Finland and Sweden
more than half of those who leave the unemployment register move into an active labour market programme, while
the proportion is close (or below) 20 per cent in Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Austria and the Netherlands.10
Figure 3.  Incidence of unemployment among various social groups, 1995
Panel A: Incidence of long-term unemployment
1 Panel B: Low-skilled unemployment rate / total unemployment rate
1994
Panel C: Youth unemployment rate/ total unemployment rate Panel D: Female unemployment rate/ Male unemployment rate
Notes:
1. The incidence is defined as the number of long-term unemployed (12 months and over) as a per cent of the total unemployed.
2. Weighted average of the countries reported in the figure.
3. 1994
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Figure 4.  Change in structural unemployment  and employment rate, 1990-95 
Percentage points
Correlation coeff.= -0.8

































-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4









































2.4.1 The rise in atypical jobs
The nature of jobs created in the labour market has changed over time and across the OECD countries.
For example, the incidence of atypical forms of work, i.e. part-time jobs and temporary jobs, has
increased in some countries while remaining broadly stable in others. A few clear patterns can,
however, be identified:
-  There seems to be some correlation between the increase in temporary contracts,
structural unemployment and the tightness of labour market regulations on hiring and
firing (see below).  Thus, the share of temporary employment in total employment ranged
from 2 per cent in the United States (almost no restrictions on labour force adjustments),
to almost 34 per cent in Spain (the country with the most rigid employment protection
regulations for permanent contracts, see below).  Moreover, in France, Italy and Spain,
three of the European countries with high structural unemployment, the use of these
arrangements has grown significantly over the past decade, partly compensating for the
fall in permanent employment.  Recent evidence for Sweden also suggests that temporary
employment contracts have somewhat contained the overall drop in employment.
However, the incidence of fixed-term work has also increased sharply in some of the
countries posting solid employment gains in the 1990s (Australia and Netherlands), but
others (e.g. Ireland) have experienced only modest increases in the incidence;
-  The rapid development of part-time employment seems to be the result of different forces.
It responds to the wish of a growing number of individuals to reconcile work with other
activities, including child-care. In this context, the rise in part-time jobs has gone hand-in-12
hand with higher participation of women in the labour force, particularly in the
Netherlands where activity rates for women increased by more than 15 percentage points
over the past decade and almost two-thirds of all female employment work currently part-
time. The rise in part-time contracts also reflects the desire of firms to increase their
overall labour flexibility, notably more flexible working-time arrangements. As stressed
above, part-time employment is sometimes involuntary in the sense that workers accept
them it in the absence of full-time alternatives, but this explanation seems generally to
account for only a small proportion of part-time jobs.
2.5 Participation rates
Most OECD countries have experienced an increase in participation rates over the past decade (Figure
5), with the most notable increases being posted by some of the countries with low and/or falling
structural unemployment.  On the contrary, deteriorating labour market conditions in the Nordic
countries led to increased discouragement and flows out of the labour forces, thereby reducing
participation rates, though they remain among the highest in the OECD area.
The most notable changes in participation rates for different groups include:
-  Male participation rates have continued to decline, while female participation rates have
generally remained on an upward trend over the past decade (Figure 5) and are strongly
related to changes in the incidence of part-time and temporary-works;
-  Participation rates for younger workers have fallen over the past decade.  This is
associated with increased school enrolment rates for teenagers and young people, which
seems also to be influenced by the difficult labour market conditions for this group.  The
relationship between labour market conditions and participation rates for the youth has
become even more evident in the 1990s when the largest drops in participation have
occurred in Europe and in particular in those countries with rising structural
unemployment
7;
-  Older workers have experienced further drops in participation rates.  This is closely
related to the availability -- and generosity -- of early-retirement possibilities embedded in
the old-age pension system or in various income-support programmes intended for, or
used by, older workers.
3. Structural reforms and the labour market
How did structural reforms contribute to the observed labour market evolutions over the past
decade?  The following sub-section briefly describes recent reforms in the OECD countries under the
headings of passive and active labour market policies, employment protection legislation, and taxes on
labour use and labour market institutions
8.
                                                  
7.  Participation rates for the youth fell also in the United Kingdom, despite the decline in structural unemployment.
However, these rates were in 1995 still among the highest of the OECD countries.
8.  For complete surveys of recent empirical studies on the determinants of structural unemployment, see Bean (1994)
and Nickell and Layard (1997). Alogoskoufis et al. (1995) discuss the European unemployment problem in details.13
Figure 5.  Participation rates by gender and age  in the two last recovery periods
1 
Per cent of relevant population group
2
Panel A: Total participation rate   Panel B: Female participation rate  
Panel C: Youth participation rate   Panel D: Old-age participation rate  
a) See note in figure2.
Notes:
1. Data shown for the different countries refer to the average of the first two years following a trough. The troughs 
    are identified  on the basis of the OECD estimates of output gap. See Giorno et al. , 1995 for details on the estimations
    of the output gap.
2. Panel A: Population of working age; Panel B: Female population of working age; Panel C: Population between 15-24 years; 
    Panel D: Population between 55-64 years.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.1 Labour market policies: recent reforms
3.1.1 Unemployment benefit systems
Unemployment benefits respond to the need to prevent sudden drops in living standards of workers
affected by a lay-off.  By providing an income support, these benefits help the unemployed to search for
a suitable job instead of accepting the first job offer at hand, thereby fostering the matching between
labour demand and supply.  Unemployment insurance benefits (UI) -- and social assistance schemes
available upon termination of UI -- generally respond to these objectives, even if there are major
differences in the levels of benefits, their maximum duration and the eligibility conditions.  As shown in
Table 1, the replacement rates are in some countries extremely high, while in others only a small
fraction of the previous wage is replaced by unemployment benefits
9.















1990 1995 1985 1995 1995 (UI)
4 (UI)
4
Australia .. .. 22,6 27,3 31 = =
Austria 61 57 30,2 25,8 .. 43%ﬁ36% =
Belgium 77 82 44,1 41,6 59 = =
Canada 83 52 27,9 27,3 47 60%ﬁ55% =
Denmark 83 84 54,0 70,3 81 = 2.5yﬁ5y
5
Finland 51 51 34,7 43,2 59 54%ﬁ61% =
France 54 54 34,1 37,5 55 57%ﬁ53% =
Germany 41 49 28,2 26,4 54 40%ﬁ37% =
Greece 53 50 7,9 22,1 .. = =
Ireland 26 22 28,2 26,1 37 41%ﬁ32% =
Italy 0,3 19,7 19 15%ﬁ33% =
Japan 36 39 9,9 9,9 45 = =
Netherlands 46 73 51,9 45,9 69 = 2yﬁ1.5y
New Zealand .. .. 30,9 29,8 34 = =
Norway 94 98 38,8 38,8 62 = =
Portugal 11 25 21,7 35,2 .. = =
Spain 21 17 34,6 31,7 49 80%ﬁ70% =
Sweden 57 66 27,2 27,3 67 90%ﬁ75% =
Switzerland 99 71 21,9 29,5 62 80%ﬁ70% 250dﬁ520d
United Kingdom 18 21 22,2 18,1 51 = 12mﬁ6m
United States 33 36 15,0 11,8 16 = =
1.  UI = unemployment insurance benefits.
Gross benefits divided by gross wages
1.  Benefit entitlements before tax as a percentage of previous earnings before tax.
Data shown are averages over two income levels, three duration categories and three
types of family circumstances.  See Martin (1996) for further information and
comparison with other indicators of generosity.  The index does not take into
account social assistance at the regional or local level.  Nor does it take account of
possibilities for the unemployed to re-qualify for unemployment benefits through
participation in active labour market measures.
2.  The figures refer to replacement rates in the first 3 months of joblessness for unemployed persons with a dependent spouse.
3.  In countries with no UI, the figures refer to guaranteed-income schemes.
4.  The extension of statutory duration was accompanied by limits on the possibility for
re-qualification for UI benefits via participation in active labour market
programmes, so effective limits on duration may have been tightened.
Source:  OECD Database on Unemployment Benefit Entitlements and Replacement
Rates;  OECD Economic Surveys.
                                                  
9.  The replacement rates reported in the table are simple averages of replacement rates relative to individuals with
different earnings (two-thirds of the average, average earnings and 2 times the average), a different duration of the
unemployment spell (1-5 years) and a different family status (single, married with dependent spouse, married without
dependent spouse).  Thus reported figures cover a wide spectrum of possibilities and consequently offer a better
picture of the overall generosity of the UB systems than those based on the initial replacement rates and/or the
maximum duration of benefits.  See Martin (1996) for details about the calculations of these replacement rates.         15
Overly generous benefits may have a negative impact on the labour market that more than compensate
the positive effects for the individuals concerned.  They may indeed raise the reservation wage and thus
create a disincentive to an active job search.  At the same time, generous benefits may increase the
pressure on wages, thereby leading to a higher equilibrium unemployment, because trade unions will be
less prone to bargain wage moderation against higher employment levels.  Empirical evidence seems to
support this point.  Scarpetta (1996) found out an elasticity of unemployment with respect to the
OECD summary measure of benefit entitlements of about 0.4, a value that is broadly in line with other
aggregate analyses of unemployment as well as with micro studies on unemployment duration (see
amongst others, Meyer, 1995; Holmlund, 1997).
There have been only limited changes in unemployment benefit replacement rates in the OECD
countries over the past decade.  As shown in Table 1, significant increases in the average replacement
rate occurred in Denmark, Finland, Greece, Portugal and Switzerland because of increases in the
maximum duration of benefits.  Only three countries show drops in the replacement rates: in Austria
and the Netherlands because benefits were not raised in line with increases in wages, and in Ireland
which moved from an earning-related system to a flat rate system.  Moreover, Sweden reduced the
initial replacement rate from 90 per cent of the previous wage to 75 per cent.
Eligibility conditions represent another important aspect of the unemployment benefit systems and a
number of countries, while leaving intact the replacement rates, have strengthened these conditions in
order to improve the targeting of the systems.  Thus, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the
Netherlands and Spain have increased the contribution period required for the benefits.  Other countries
have raised the minimum age of fruition, excluded workers who have quit their job or excluded the
possibility of re-qualifying for the benefits through a period of training or other active programs
(Denmark, Finland, Norway and Switzerland).
There is some evidence that tighter eligibility criteria may lead to lower structural unemployment.  For
example,  Layard  et al. (1991) suggest that the significant decline in the number of registered
unemployment in the United Kingdom in the mid-1980s could be in part attributed to the tightening of
eligibility conditions and, in particular, active search requirement introduced in 1986 in that country.
Along the same lines, Abbring et al.(1995) reported a marked increase in the flows from unemployment
to employment in the Netherlands after the strengthening of sanctions against those not actively
searching for a job.
3.2.2 Active labour market policies
The origin of active labour market policies in the OECD area dates back from the sixties.  First
introduced in Sweden and in the United States, they were conceived as a means to remove bottlenecks
in short term adjustments.  Specific needs and constraints conditioned the timing and intensity with
which other OECD countries responded to the initiative.  In the seventies and eighties, as
unemployment became a more pervasive problem, active labour market policies received a greater
attention in most OECD countries. 
Active labour market policies are generally designed to meet three main objectives: i) mobilising human
resources; ii) training and retraining the labour force; and iii) improving job opportunities of
disadvantaged workers such as the long-term unemployed who have lost contact with the labour market
or displaced workers.  These objectives materialise on the supply side, where active programmes
provide training, counselling and job placement; and on the demand side, where active programmes
offer subsidies and incentives that reduce the burden of economic adjustment for enterprises.
Furthermore, since unemployment hits with unequal intensity different groups of the population (see16
above), the need for social equity becomes more pressing.  In this context, an optimum combination of
efficiency and equity goals is considered a paramount challenge for active labour market policies.
The OECD experience offers a number of lessons concerning the effectiveness of different active
programmes in curbing unemployment and addressing equity goals
10:
-  Employment training programmes open to all unemployed and not targeted on specific
labour market needs are generally very expensive and offer low or insignificant returns.
An issue often debated in the OECD countries is whether training is more effective on-
the-job or off-the-job. In the most recent past, several countries have more clearly opted
for the first option, that is, work experience and  practical job training. Leaving aside cost
factors, this choice seems to the based on the assumption that the generally low skills of
the long-term unemployed is, amongst other things, a signal of their negative reaction to
direct training in the education system and that a direct involvement of these persons into
a job-training scheme may increase the motivation and confidence in the programme;
-  Job search assistance and intensified counselling do raise considerably re-employment
probabilities for the unemployed in general, and the disadvantaged groups in particular.
Indeed, in a number of countries there has been a distinctive move towards this approach
of selective measures focusing on the most disadvantaged unemployed during the last
decade
11. In some countries, for example, employment offices have adopted special
procedures to make sure that long-term unemployed are involved in different kinds of
in-depth actions.  Specific interviews are designed to address the unemployed towards an
active approach in the labour market and in most of the cases these interviews are
obligatory after a given duration of unemployment
12.  When not focusing on self-help,
interviews with the long-term unemployed are used to identify specific training
requirements and to adjust existing active labour market programmes to their specific
needs;
-  Subsidies to employment are generally not effective in helping the unemployed to get
permanent jobs in the private sector. The positive impact they have on employment is
generally accompanied by high costs.  In particular, there could be "dead-weight" costs
when participants would have obtained a new job anyway, but also costs due to
"substitution effects" in all cases when the genuine job impact (i.e. for participants who
would not have found employment without the help of these schemes) is obtained at the
expense of other job seekers.  In general, broadly targeted programmes appear to suffer
from very high dead-weight costs, while the narrow targeting ones suffer more from the
substitution effects. However, they may help the individuals to keep in contact with the
labour market, thus maintaining their motivation and skills.  For equity reasons, they may
also be intended to provide the long-term unemployed with jobs even if this is at the
expenses of the short-term unemployed;
                                                  
10.  See also OECD (1997a); Calmfors (1994); Calmfors and Skedinger (1995).
11.  In some countries, after the first generic contact with staff of the offices further interviews are organised with
specialists.  These interviews generally focus on counselling and advice ranging from how to improve the job search,
to the definition of training needs and to measures to overcome disability.  These activities focus on self-help, like the
"job clubs" in Australia, France, and the U.K., or the "job finding clubs" in Canada or the "help yourself groups" in
Austria.  In other countries, training centres provide short courses with a similar purpose, like in Ireland with the "job
search courses" and in Denmark with "labour market introduction" courses.
12.  These interviews have different names: "Newstart" in Australia, "Restart" in the Netherlands and the U.K. or the
"13th month interview" in France.17
-  Direct job creation in the public sector has also been of little help in moving the
unemployed into permanent jobs because they generally offer jobs with low marginal
productivity and thus do not raise the attractiveness of participants for private employers.
These schemes may, however, be used as a work test and as a means of helping the
unemployed maintain contact with the labour market.  To that end, they should be short in
duration and not become a disguised form of permanent employment;
-  Aid to unemployed starting enterprises appears to be successful for a small group of
highly motivated individuals.
Table 2 shows the average annual expenditure (as a share of GDP) for active labour market programs
in the OECD countries over the past decade.  There are significant differences in the overall
commitment of countries to active policy as well as in the orientation among the different schemes.
Expenditure for active policy has generally increased over the past decade, not least because of the
increase in unemployment.  Indeed, expenditure per capita (the unemployed) has often declined because
expenditures have not kept pace with the rise in the number of job seekers.  In terms of orientation,
there has been a tendency towards training and counselling activities, while employment subsidies have
been somewhat contained.
Table 2.  Spending on active labour market policy: evolution over the 1985-1995




































Austria 0,3 0,4 39 35 32 32 7 5 4 8 18 19
Belgium 1,2 1,4 14 17 9 21 0 9 64 42 13 12
Canada 0,6 0,6 38 34 54 57 0 0 3 4 5 5
Denmark 1,1 2,3 7 5 47 43 1 2 0 20 45 30
Finland 0,9 1,6 9 10 30 28 4 7 42 34 15 21
France 0,7 1,2 19 14 37 38 9 4 0 11 35 33
Germany 0,8 1,3 26 17 25 29 6 5 15 23 28 26
Greece 0,2 0,4 38 42 14 19 24 19 5 0 19 19
Ireland 1,6 .. 11 .. 42 .. 6 .. 6 .. 35 ..
Italy 0,5 .. 18 .. 13 .. 0 .. 0 .. 69 ..
Japan 0,2 0,1 19 27 19 27 56 45 6 0 0 0
Netherlands 1,1 1,1 7 16 17 15 2 1 4 8 70 59
New Zealand 0,8 0,7 12 17 11 49 5 14 69 6 3 13
Norway 0,7 1,4 18 13 17 17 3 7 29 10 33 53
Portugal 0,4 0,7 19 15 51 30 2 0 7 1 20 53
Spain 0,3 0,7 26 13 6 49 35 17 29 7 4 15
Sweden 2,1 3,0 12 9 24 26 5 9 15 18 44 38
Switzerland 0,2 0,5 45 21 5 17 0 2 0 17 50 43
United Kingdom 0,7 0,5 19 40 13 25 4 0 26 2 38 34
United States 0,3 0,2 25 35 43 20 3,5 5 3,5 5 25 35
1.  Expenditures for public employment services and administration.
2.  Training: Labour market training.
3.  Subsidies: Subsidies to regular employment in the private sector,
4.  Job creation: Direct job creation (public or non-profit).
5.  Other:  Youth measures, support of unemployed persons starting enterprises, and measures for the disabled.
6.  1990/91 for the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Sweden; 1991 for France.
7.  1994/95 for the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Sweden; 1994 for France,
Belgium, Greece and Portugal.
Source:  OECD Employment Outlook (various issues).18
Empirical evidence on the overall impact of active programmes on aggregate unemployment in mixed.
Scarpetta (1996) suggest a small and often not statistically significant effect on unemployment.  These
results are in contrast with those of Layard et al. (1991) and Nickell and Layard (1997) who found a
somewhat more significant impact, but are consistent with a number of studies based on micro data.
However, empirical results are suggestive of a greater impact of active policy on employment rates
(Scarpetta, 1996), confirming that these policies could have a positive effect on labour force
participation by keeping otherwise discouraged workers in the labour market.  Moreover, the results
suggests that there is not a linear relationship between spending on active programmes and the impact
on unemployment, but rather there are declining returns to scale
13.  Too generous active policy may do
more harms than good because they may displace many jobs.  Job displacement may occur for at least
two reasons.  First, active programmes may increase unions' resistance to wage moderation in the face
of shocks when active programmes reduce the income loss associated with open unemployment.
Second, job search may be weakened if programmes fail to improve employability and skills.
3.1.3 Employment protection legislation (EPL)
Almost all OECD countries have employment protection regulations that limit the freedom of firms to
hire and fire workers.  These regulations govern unfair dismissals, restrictions on lay-offs for economic
reasons, compulsory severance payments, minimum notice periods and administrative authorisations.
By reinforcing job security, these regulations may enhance productivity performance, as workers will
be more willing to co-operate with employers in the development of the production process.  Long-term
employment relations may also encourage employers in providing training to workers with potentially
beneficial effects of human capital and labour productivity.  However, if these regulations are very
strict, as it is the case in many European countries, firms may become more cautious about adjusting
their workforce with the ultimate effect of reducing labour turnover – movements from employment to
unemployment and from unemployment back to employment (Bertola and Rogerson, 1997).  Moreover,
strict regulations may affect the structure of employment by indirectly promoting atypical labour
contracts (see above) which offer firms the work force flexibility they would not have otherwise
enjoyed, but which may act to consolidate insider power (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994).
As expected, empirical evidence (Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell and Layard, 1997) suggests that stricter EPL
regulations are related to lower short-term unemployment and greater long-term unemployment and
Bertola (1992) pointed out the negative effects of EPL on employment turnover. Moreover, Lazear
(1990) and Scarpetta (1996) pointed to a negative impact of strict EPL on participation rates and
Nickell and Layard (1997) to a positive impact on productivity growth.  There is somewhat  less
consensus as to the overall impact of EPL on unemployment and employment levels.
Even if there are marked differences in the strictness of EPL in the OECD countries, there has been a
tendency towards less constraining hiring and firing practices. In particular, there has been some
relaxation of the employment protection in the case of individual and/or collective dismissals in Italy
(1991), Portugal (1989, 1991) the United Kingdom (1993), Spain and, more recently, in Germany and
the Netherlands.  This seems to have resulted in a drop in the share of firms who perceive EPL as a
constraint on workforce adjustment (Table 3).
                                                  
13.  In Scarpetta (1996), the empirical results of the effects of active labour market expenditure on unemployment were
strongly affected by the inclusion of Sweden in the country panel.  In particular, the exclusion of this country implied
a stronger (and statistically significant) negative impact of active programmes on unemployment.  This result could
be explained by the fact that Sweden has both extremely high expenditures for active labour market programmes
(four times the OECD average in the past decade) and a level of unemployment which, albeit low until recently, is
comparable with those of countries which spent much less on ALMPs.19
The increase in atypical job contracts has also de facto helped employers in coping with stringent EPL,
thereby reinforcing the dichotomy between workers with standard (i.e. permanent full time) contracts
and the other workers who often bear the brunt of labour market flexibility.  Thus, temporary contracts
have often increased in the OECD countries reducing firing costs for the firms.  Spain and Italy have,
for example, recently allowed temporary work agency to operate and Belgium and Finland allowed the
renewal of temporary contracts with the same employer.  The increase in part-time employment may
also have de facto reduced the impact of rigid EPL, since in some countries part-time workers do not
enjoy the same degree of protection as their full-time colleagues.
Table 3 Employment protection legislation






All companies Companies with more than 500
employees
1989 1995 1989 1995 1989
Belgium 57 67 51 67 10,5
France 62 57 62 57 9,5
Germany 63 62 59 66 12
Greece 55 57 75 80 11
Ireland 50 62 58 46 2,75
Italy 78 49 80 48 14,25
Netherlands 71 48 76 39 7,25
Portugal 54 33 .. 36 12,5
Spain 68 65 60 66 11,25
United Kingdom 44 25 55 35 2,25
average 60 53 64 56
1.  The question in the 1994 survey  was: Are the following reasons for not employing more people very important,
important or not (so) important? Insufficient flexibility in hiring and shedding labour,...”  The question in the 1994
survey was:  “Are the following reasons for not employing more people in relation to output very important, important
or not (so) important?  Insufficient flexibility in shedding staff, ...”.
Source:  OECD (1997), “ Implementing the OECD Jobs Strategy: Member Countries’ Experience”, Paris.
3.2.4 Non-wage labour costs
The OECD Jobs Study stressed that high taxes on labour might spread onto labour costs, with
potentially short and long-term effects on employment.  The extent to which this occurs depends upon
the functioning of both product and labour markets.  If markets are imperfect and workers are able to
resist offsetting wage cuts, an increase in taxes on labour may result in lower employment
14. The
bargaining strength of trade unions is important in this respect, as it is the ability of firms to pay wages
                                                  
14.  Among others, see  Tyrväinen (1995)  for empirical simulations of the effects of tax increases under alternative
assumptions about the degree of competition in labour markets.  Daveri and Tabellini (1997) have also suggested that
the impact of the tax wedge on unemployment may vary according to the degree of centralisation of wage bargaining.
In continental European countries with intermediate levels of centralisation of the wage bargaining process (i.e., at
the sectoral level) the effects of the tax wedge are stronger because wages do not adjust enough.  On the contrary, in
both highly centralised and decentralised countries, wages react more to changes in the tax wedge.20
in excess of market-clearing levels which, in turn, depends upon the degree of competition in the
product market.  Moreover, an increase in taxes may be particularly detrimental to the employment
prospects of certain categories of workers, such as low-paid workers, but not for others.  For example,
in the case of low-paid workers, employers may not be able to reduce wages to compensate for an
increase in social security contributions if binding wage floors are established by statutory minimum
wages, negotiated wage floors or high reservation wages induced by social welfare provisions.
There is no consensus as to the effects of tax wedge on the labour market.  A number of studies
(including Nickell and Layard, 1997) suggest a temporary negative impact of an increase in the tax
wedge on employment but, as soon as the wage adjust to the new level of taxes, the negative
employment effect is reabsorbed.  This result is also confirmed by a study on wages and employment at
the micro level in Chile (Gruber 1997) who suggests that wages adjust completely to changes in the
taxes on labour.  However, Daveri and Tabellini (1997) and Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998)
have suggested that the impact of the tax wedge on unemployment may vary according to the degree of
centralisation of wage bargaining (see below).  In continental European countries with intermediate
levels of centralisation of the wage bargaining process (i.e., at the  sectoral level with lacking
co-ordination) the effects of the tax wedge are stronger because wages do not adjust enough.  On the
contrary, in both highly centralised and decentralised countries, wages react more to changes in the tax
wedge.
Table 4 presents the evolutions of the tax wedge – including employees’ and employers’ social security
contributions and income taxes – for an average production worker.  There is an enormous variation in
the tax wedge across the OECD countries stretching from below 25 per cent of the gross wage
(Australia, Japan, Iceland and New Zealand) to values greater than 45 per cent in a number of
European countries (Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden).  As shown in the table,
some of the countries with high taxes on labour have recently implemented reforms.  Thus, the tax
wedge declined significantly in Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, while only
Germany significantly raised the tax wedge in Europe.
Since they have a direct impact on labour costs, at least in the short term, social security contributions
have often be the target of reforms (third and fourth columns in Table 4).  Belgium, Finland and France
reduced employers’ contribution rates, but the fiscal position of these countries meant that other taxes
had to be raised to offset revenue losses, thereby producing negligible overall effects on the tax wedge.
Social security contributions were lowered for low-productivity workers in France, Belgium and
Ireland.  Among the OECD countries, Italy and Greece are the only two that have raised social security
contributions by more than one percentage point.
3.2 Institutional factors
3.2.1 Unions and the wage bargaining process
The wage setting process can play a crucial role in determining labour-market conditions.  In countries
where wages are predominantly set via collective bargaining, wages may remain above market clearing
levels despite the adverse consequences on employment.  However, these effects may be moderated, or
even reversed, in contexts of fully centralised wage bargaining or when there is a high level of co-
ordination among employers and among unions.
One of the key element characterising industrial relations is the union density (the proportion of workers
who are members of trade unions). Over the past three decades there has been a generalised tendency
for a decline in the degree of unionisation, especially in some European countries where in the 1970s
the large majority of workers were members of trade unions (OECD, Employment Outlook - 1997).21
Yet, the degree of unionisation is not per se sufficient to identify workers’ market power.  In many
countries, the administrative extension of wage agreements means that the terms and conditions of
union contracts often cover workers who are not union members.  By the same token, high union power
in one sector can lead to spillover effects in non-union sectors.
Table 4.  Tax wedge and social security contributions
1
In per cent of gross wages
Total tax wedge Employers’ social security
contribution rate
1985 1994 1985 1994
Australia 22,9 23,5 0,0 0,0
Austria 40,3 39,7 18,6 19,1
Belgium 54,2 53,5 28,8 25,8
Canada 26,9 31,4 4,7 6,2
Denmark 47,8 45,2 2,8 0,0
Finland 38,0 39,4 5,7 3,6
France 43,4 43,6 27,5 26,2
Germany 44,5 48,3 14,5 16,3
Greece 31,4 .. 17,9 21,6
Iceland 16,5 22,9 2,1 2,8
Ireland 42,4 38,4 10,9 10,9
Italy 50,0 49,9 29,9 31,5
Japan 21,6 21,6 6,8 7,0
Luxembourg 38,4 35,1 13,3 13,0
Mexico .. 26,5 15,2 16,2
Netherlands 49,9 45,6 19,2 7,3
New Zealand 27,9 24,3 0,0 0,0
Norway 41,8 36,9 13,5 11,3
Portugal 30,7 34,3 16,7 19,7
Spain 36,6 38,8 23,8 24,0
Sweden 50,9 46,8 24,0 23,2
Switzerland 28,8 28,7 9,4 9,3
Turkey 37,0 35,7 8,3 6,7
United Kingdom 37,8 33,3 9,5 9,3
United States 33,6 31,2 6,6 7,1
1.  Total tax wedges include income taxes, employer and employee social security
contributions, but not indirect taxes.  Tax rates refer to one-earner without dependants
and take into account standard tax relief.
Source:  OECD, Tax/Benefit Position of Production Workers (various issues).
The degree of centralisation of wage bargaining is an important characteristic of industrial relations.  A
highly centralised wage bargaining system may allow the economy to respond in a more consistent way
to adverse shocks than decentralised systems in which different groups/sectors/companies negotiate
separately over wages (Tarantelli, 1986; Bruno and Sachs, 1985).  However, Calmfors and Driffill
(1988) have stressed that the relationship between centralisation of wage bargaining and wage
outcomes is not linear, but rather  hump-shaped
15.  This implies that both highly centralised (co-
operative) bargaining structures -- such as those in Austria and the Nordic countries -- and fully
decentralised (competitive) structures (United States) offer the best results.  In an intermediate
                                                  
15.  However, the hump-shaped hypothesis has also been criticised.  See in particular Soskice (1990) and the OECD
(1997c).22
(i.e. neither highly centralised nor highly decentralised) system -- as in many EU countries -- bargaining
units are strong enough to generate  dis-employment effects, but at the same time, each unit is
vulnerable to other units’ wage strategies without being able to influence these strategies.  Especially in
intermediate systems, the degree of co-operation between employers on the one hand and among trade
unions on the other hand may be crucial for the labour market.  Even if wages are negotiated at
different bargaining tables, the co-ordination between the social partners ensures that possible
externalities are taken into account and the system mimics highly centralised systems.
In the OECD countries only the New Zealand has introduced major reforms to the industrial relations
legislation in the early 1990s which have radically changed the wage formation process.  The
Employment Contract Act abolished the exclusive right of trade unions to represent workers at the
bargaining table and eliminated preferential treatment of union members as well as the possibility of
carrying out secondary strikes.  The act also abolished the long-standing award system, which had
extended sectoral wage agreements to third parties.  The immediate effect of this major reform was the
drop in union density from 45 per cent to 30 per cent and a large contraction in the number of workers
covered by sectoral wage agreements.  Australia has also implemented reforms in this are since 1988
banning compulsory unionism and preferences to union members in employment.  Contrary to New
Zealand, a simplified award system has been maintained to guarantee a safety net of fair minimum
wages and conditions.  The United Kingdom has continued over the 1990s the reform process initiated
in the mid-1980s.  For example, closed shops and secondary picketing were banned, and greater legal
responsibilities were imposed on unions for their actions.  Moreover, employers can now choose not to
recognise unions and bargain with individuals directly.
In the continental European countries reforms in the industrial-relation system have generally been
more gradual, maintaining bargaining among the social partners as the key element of wage
determination, but trying to improve co-ordination among the different levels of negotiation (national,
sectoral, firm level).  For example, in Italy social partners agreed in the context of the 1993
income-policy agreement to reinforce the co-ordination between the sectoral and firm-level bargaining
processes.  In Italy and Denmark there has also been a tendency towards a decentralisation of wage
determination, with the nation-wide agreement only fixing the basic wage increases.  In Belgium, wage
increases determined at the sectoral levels became subject to limits negotiated at the central level, while
the latter were constrained by prospective average wage increases in three neighbouring countries.
Moreover, in countries like Germany and Spain, firms in difficulty can benefit from the opt-out clauses,
even if such clauses are rarely used in the former because they require approval by higher level
associations.
3.2.2 Minimum wage
In a number of OECD countries, wage setting also depends upon minimum wage arrangements, which
are designed to bring living standards of the lowest paid workers to some minimum acceptable level.  In
15 OECD countries, the government sets minimum wages unilaterally or following recommendations
by a tripartite body.  In a number of other countries, collective agreements at the national or sectoral
level set effective minimum wages for unionised workers and, in some cases, such agreements are
administratively extended to cover whole sectors of activities.
The level of the statutory minimum wages -- relative to some measure of the average wages – varies
substantially across the OECD countries.  When expressed relative to the mean wage of full-time
workers, the statutory minimum wage tended to be highest in Belgium and France in 1996 and the
lowest in the Czech Republic, Korea and Spain (Figure 6).  One way to assess the effectiveness of the
statutory minimum wage as a distributional policy tool is to look at its impact on the incidence of low
pay and poverty.  The effect of the minimum wage on earnings distribution -- and ultimately on the
incidence of low pay -- depends on how wage rates above the minimum react to changes in the statutory23
wage floor.  If spillover effects are important, the introduction of a minimum wage -- or an increase in
the existing minimum -- may have a limited impact on the incidence of low pay, as old wage
differentials will be restored.  However, empirical evidence for some OECD countries suggests that
spillover effects from increases in the minimum wages are limited and, consequently, changes in the
minimum wages may indeed have an impact on low pay
16.  This is also corroborated by cross-country
correlations between the level of the statutory minimum wage relative to the average wages and the
incidence of low pay: countries with a relatively high minimum wage tend to have a lower incidence of
low pay.
While there is some consensus on the equalising effects of the minimum wages on the distribution of
wage earnings and working household income (i.e. household with at least one member in paid
employment), there is little evidence suggesting that statutory minimum floors help reduce poverty
17.
This is because, a significant proportion of low-paid workers live in relatively well-off families and, at
the same time, a substantial proportion of poor families in many OECD countries do not have any
adults in work.
Moreover, the positive effects of the statutory minimum wage on the incidence of low pay needs to be
assessed against its effects on employment, which ultimately depend upon the distribution of skills and
experience across the labour force and the level at which the minimum wage truncates the wage
distribution.  These effects should also be seen in a dynamic perspective.  The introduction of a
minimum wage may increase the supply of labour with possible substitution effects across low-paid
workers, i.e. more workers may enter the labour market and displace employed workers with relatively
lower qualifications
18.  Likewise, high levels of the minimum wage may have detrimental effects on
product market competition.  Insofar as new firms offer wages that are below the sectoral average, the
introduction of a minimum wage may create an implicit barrier to entry in low-pay industries, thereby
reducing competition.
Empirical evidence on the sensitivity of employment to the minimum wage is not clear-cut.  Low levels
of the minimum wages are found to produce ambiguous effects on aggregate employment, while there
seems to be a clearer consensus of the negative effects of high levels of the minimum on the
employment prospects of low-productivity workers. Thus, in the United States -- where the Federal
minimum wage is relatively low compared to the median wage and has tended to decline over time in
relative terms due to the lack of indexation-- empirical studies do not suggest any significant impact on
employment.  By contrast, empirical evidence of the French minimum wage (SMIC) -- which is high
relative to the median wage – points to a significant negative impact on youth employment and, in some
                                                  
16.  In particular, DiNardo et al. (1996) suggested that declines in the Federal minimum wage relative to average wages
in the United States contributed significantly to the raise in male earnings inequality over the 1980s.  Card and
Kreuger (1995) also suggested that the increase in the Federal minimum in 1990 and 1991 may have contributed to
reducing earnings inequality.  Dickens et al. (1994) found that the minimum wages set by the Wage Councils, prior to
their abolition in 1993, had a significant equalising impact on earnings distribution.
17. Card and Kreuger (1995) did not find any significant impact of changes in minimum wages on poverty in the United
States.  Gosling (1996) stressed that the introduction of a national minimum in the United Kingdom would have
resulted in a very small reduction in poverty rate if all households were taken into account. Machin and Manning
(1996) reported a significant equalising effect of a statutory minimum wage on the income distribution of employed
households, but a smaller equalising impact on the income of all working-age households.
18.  In Spain, the statutory minimum wage those aged 16 and under was raised to the level for those aged 17 in 1990.  As
a consequence, the employment rate of teenagers dropped significantly, while that of young workers (20-24 years of
age) rose (Dolado et al., 1996).  In France, it has been estimated the recent reduction of social security contributions
on low wages (up to 133 % of SMIC) could have produced 75 000 more jobs at the SMIC, but at the expenses of job
losses estimated at 20 000 among those with higher wages, due to substitution effects. See Conseil Supérieur de
l’Emploi des Revenues et des Coûts, “L’Allègement des Charges Sociales sur les Bas Salaires- Rapport au Premier
Ministre”, Paris 1996.24
cases, on overall employment
19.  Hence, the choice of the level of the minimum wage as well as of its
adjustment with age is crucial in the design of the statutory minima.
4. Different approaches to structural reforms
As described above, most OECD countries have implemented labour market reforms in the recent past.
Yet, the coverage and intensity of reforms vary a great deal across countries, which explains why only
in a few of them have the effects of the reforms clearly emerged in the labour market.  There are a
number of elements that should be taken into account when trying to relate structural reforms and
labour market developments.  These include: i) the intensity of the reform strategy; ii) the coverage of
reforms; and iii) the time elapsed from the introduction of reforms to the observation of their potential
impact on the labour market.
4.1 Similarities in the reform strategy
As stressed in OECD (1997b), there are a number of similarities in the reform strategy pursued by the
four countries that have the most progressed in the combat against unemployment.  At the time when
major reforms were introduced, all of them faced serious economic disequilibria that urged immediate
and serious actions.  Macroeconomic stabilisation measures were also considered as an integral part of
the reform strategy.  Despite alternative successes, by 1997 the four countries posted relatively low
inflation (below 2 per cent in Ireland, Netherlands and New Zealand), general government balances
either in surplus (Ireland and New Zealand) or with a deficit of less than 2.5 per cent of GDP (United
Kingdom and the Netherlands).      
The wide scope of the reform package is another common aspect of the reform strategy in the four
countries as well as in Canada and Australia.  Not only have the reforms affected many elements of the
labour market, but they have also been accompanied by measures aimed at fostering competition in the
product market via deregulation and the privatisation of state enterprises in the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands and New Zealand.  Thus, wage moderation -- which has generally been a component of the
labour market adjustment process -- has translated into lower prices rather than higher producers’ rents.
As stressed by Coe and Snower (1996), labour market policies and institutions have complementary
effects on the labour market and thus reforms in these areas are also complementary.  In this context,
the wide-ranging dimension of reforms in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and,
more recently, Canada and Australia has most likely been a key determinant of their success in curbing
unemployment and improving overall labour market conditions.  The beneficial effects stemming from
the complementarity of reforms have also been accompanied by a relatively greater support from the
population at large and workers in particular.  By changing legislation on industrial relations, social
security, employment protection or other areas affecting most workers -- including those who play a
dominant role in the wage bargaining process -- the reforms were more powerful than those in
continental European countries that typically affected people at the margin, with very little impact on
core groups.
                                                  
19. There is also a fairly significant relationship between the level of the minimum wages relative to the average wage
and the incidence of employment at (or below) the minimum.  Thus, in the United States in the mid-1990s  (and
Canada in the mid-1980s) around 5 per cent of full-time workers had their wage at or less than the statutory
minimum.  On the contrary, in France more than 10 per cent of employees in the private and semi-private sector,
excluding agriculture, were receiving wages at the level of the SMIC.25
4.2 The role of social partners
A central issue dividing the reform strategy has been the involvement of social partners in the design
and implementation of reforms.  The Netherlands and Ireland carried out their reforms through a
consensual process, which was considered as vital for their successful implementation. In Ireland,
several aspects of the reforms were subject to a formal trilateral bargaining between unions, employers
and the government (and recently extended to cover other ‘outsiders’ such as representatives of the
unemployed). These tripartite agreements typically committed the government to some action, including
tax reduction in a framework of sound fiscal policy, in exchange for moderate wage demands.
In the Netherlands, the 1982 tripartite agreement (Wassenaar) determined a protracted period of wage
moderation (real wages have remained practically stable over the past 15 years); a reduction of
statutory minimum wages, especially among young workers; a greater flexibility in working time
arrangements, including a reduction in the weekly working hours and greater possibilities for part-time
jobs.  Subsequent reforms allowed temporary contracts and private temporary work agencies.
Moreover, the governments engaged in a reduction in taxes on labour and capital and employers have
accepted further improvement in product market competition.
By contrast, reforms in the United Kingdom and New Zealand were not implemented through a formal
process of consensus and the unions were largely excluded from the process. As stressed above, in both
countries, an important part of the reform programme involved far-reaching changes in their industrial-
relations systems that left little scope for consensus.  Notwithstanding the fact that some groups have
faced adjustment costs, reforms met with considerable acceptance by the general public, and in both
countries there has been little political support for wholesale reversal of them.
4.3 Timing of reforms
It takes time before the beneficial effects of structural reforms surface in the labour market.  Workers
and firms have to adapt to the new conditions set by the reforms and there might be short-term
adjustment costs. Thus, it is not surprise that the countries that have shown the most evident signs of
improvement in their labour market conditions (Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and New
Zealand) are also those that introduced major reforms in the mid- to late-eighties.  In the most recent
period, Australia, Denmark, Canada, Italy and Spain have also introduced important policy reforms,
and, at least in the first two countries, these reforms have already manifested their positive effects on
the labour market.
The time lag required for structural reforms to produce beneficial effects on the labour market
underlines the importance of stable macroeconomic conditions.  Over the past decade, countries that
managed to minimise macroeconomic fluctuations have avoided strong increases in actual
unemployment and estimated structural unemployment.  On the contrary, those with large fluctuations
in unemployment have also experienced stronger increases in unemployment, as part of the increases,
which were initially cyclical, have become structural.  Greater fluctuations may generate a climate of
uncertainties which could lead to higher cost of capital and reduced incentives for engaging in
productivity-enhancing innovation activity. Moreover, such an environment may reduce the scope for
wage moderation.  In this context, it has been argued (OECD, 1997b) that the United Kingdom and
New Zealand may have not experienced a reduction in structural unemployment as early as the scope of
their structural reforms would have suggested because cyclical fluctuations increased over the past
decade.  Along the same lines, the large fluctuations in unemployment in Spain over the past decade led
to a rise in structural unemployment despite the significant reforms undertaken.  In contrast,
stabilisation measures in Netherlands, together with labour market reforms, have both gone in the
direction of reducing structural unemployment.26
5. Concluding remarks
This paper presented an overview of labour market conditions in the OECD countries and shed light on
recent structural reforms.  Labour market conditions vary a great deal across the OECD countries and
the discrepancies have increased over the past decade.  Most countries have undertaken actions, but the
coverage and intensity of reforms has been disparate.
In countries like the United States, Japan and Norway, existing policy settings prevented a significant
deterioration in labour market conditions in the first place, and no major reform was required.  In other,
mainly European, countries labour market conditions have further deteriorated with a rise in structural
unemployment and low participation rates.  Yet, only the United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands and
New Zealand have undertaken wide-range structural reforms over a sufficient long time to make a
significant impact on structural unemployment.  More recently, Canada and Australia have carried out
substantial reforms, though the results have only very recently started to surface in the labour market.
The experience of countries that have succeeded in curbing unemployment suggests that results
generally lag behind the introduction of reforms and, consequently, the reform process needs to be
pursued consistently for a long period to bear fruits.  Noteworthy, pursuing a wide-ranging approach to
structural reforms is likely to bring better results than concentrating in a few areas because it allows
exploiting synergies.  Moreover such an approach insures that both the benefits and inevitable
short-term costs of adjustment are widely shared among the population and do not discriminate against
a few groups.  There are also significant differences in the way structural reforms have been
implemented in the different countries, reflecting each country’ initial conditions as well as the
institutional setting and national traditions.
There are a number of lessons that can be drawn from empirical evidence on the role of different labour
market policies on unemployment.  And recent reforms implemented in the OECD countries can be seen
under this perspective:
•  The “generosity” of income support schemes is an important factor in explaining cross-country
differences in structural unemployment.  Unemployment benefits that are overly generous in terms
of either the duration or the level of support tend to raise reservation wages and lengthen the
duration of the unemployment spells.  Recent experience from the OECD countries has been
disparate: some of them have raised benefit levels and/or lengthened their maximum duration, while
others have reduced either one or the other aspect of the system.  In a number of cases, actions have
focused on eligibility, availability or willingness-to-work requirements as well as rules concerning
temporary layoffs.
•  There is little evidence that active labour market programmes significantly improve labour market
conditions, although well targeted measures may help groups with specific needs. Over the recent
past, expenditure for active policy has generally increased, not least because of the increase in
unemployment. Recognising the need for well-targeted measures, there has been an orientation
towards training and counselling activities, while employment subsidies have been somewhat
contained.
•  Strict employment protection rules tend to reduce employment turnover and the supply of vacancies
and, according to some studies, led to higher structural unemployment and, especially, lower
participation rates. Accordingly, there has been a tendency towards less constraining hiring and
firing practices in a number of OECD countries, even if in some of them reforms focused on
temporary contracts, leaving intact the protection for permanent workers.
•  High taxes on labour use might be reflected in labour cost developments with adverse effects on
employment in the short and, potentially, the long run.  There are wide differences in the average27
tax wedge across the OECD countries and recent reforms have not reduced these disparities.  Some
countries have taken actions to reduce high marginal tax rates on low incomes, while others, mainly
English-speaking countries, have taken measures to reduce unemployment traps through the use of
employment-conditional benefits.
•  Empirical evidence emphasises the importance of wage flexibility in reducing unemployment.
Aggregate wage flexibility tend to neutralise adverse shocks to aggregate labour demand, while
relative wage flexibility helps attaining better matching of labour demand and supply across
different groups.  This is an area where the experience of OECD countries has varied the most.
Major steps towards decentralised wage bargaining have been made in New Zealand and Australia,
while a number of European countries have pursued tripartite wage agreements but have in some
cases tried to improve the co-ordination between the different levels of bargaining (i.e. national,
sectoral and firm level).  Significant reductions in statutory minimum wages relative to the average
wage have taken place in some European countries, and others have reduced non-wage labour costs
for low-wage workers.28
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